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An Economic Analysis of the Nuclear Liability Subsidy 
MICHAEL G. FAURE LL.M.* AND KARINE FIORE** 
I.  INTRODUCTION1 
Energy markets are undergoing major change.  They have to cope with 
a new economic environment and, at the same time, a new energy context.  
Indeed, on the one hand, energy markets are undergoing deregulation with 
the aim of opening them to competition.2  They are also submitted to priva-
tisation policies, which progressively detach them from the government’s 
hold.3  This trend is transforming the market structure and might particu-
larly modify operators’ behaviour and strategies.  On the other hand, energy 
markets face new environmental constraints.  Indeed, fossil fuel resources, 
such as oil, coal, and gas, which are still widely used today, are highly pol-
luting and largely contribute to the greenhouse effect.4  Moreover, they are 
getting scarcer and scarcer because their world reserves are running short.5  
Therefore, under the Kyoto Protocol regime, the question of future energy 
sources arises with acuteness today. 
 
 *   Academic Director of the Maastricht European Institute for Transnational Legal Re-
search (METRO), Professor of Comparative and International Environmental Law, Maas-
tricht University and Professor of Comparative Private Law and Economics, Erasmus Uni-
versity Rotterdam (the Netherlands). 
 **  Centre d’Analyse Economique, Paul Cézanne University, Aix en Provence (France). 
 1. We are grateful to the participants of the annual conference of the European Associa-
tion for Law and Economics (EALE) (Madrid, Sept. 2006) for their useful comments on an 
earlier draft. 
 2. See, e.g., Matthew W. White, Power Struggles: Explaining Deregulatory Reforms in 
Electricity Markets, 1996 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, MICROECONOMICS 201, 
201 (1996). 
 3. See id. 
 4. See, e.g., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Fourth Assessment Report, 
2007. 
 5. The exhaustion of the current world reserves for oil, gas, and coal are respectively 
estimated at 40 years, 70 years, and 230 years, at the current level of consumption.  See 
Energie et environnement, http://www.cea.fr/jeunes/themes/l_energie/la_production_d_ 
energie/energie_et_environnement (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
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In such a context, the role of nuclear energy in future energy policies is 
coming back on stage. Indeed, nuclear energy is considered to have great 
potential, especially under new environmental requirements related to the 
necessary reduction of CO2 emissions.6 It is abundant, immediately 
available and, most importantly, does not emit any greenhouse gases.7  In 
this respect, it seems to be an ideal candidate for future energy programs 
which must focus on accessible, available, and carbon neutral energy 
sources.  Thus, some countries are now discussing the reintroduction of 
nuclear energy even in cases where nuclear energy was being formally 
phased out (like in the Netherlands).8  However, nuclear energy also has 
shown severe weaknesses; it produces hazardous radioactive wastes9 and 
generates risks for extensive damage to the environment and public 
health.10  If the problem of radioactive wastes management already has 
some (even sub-optimal and still uncertain) solutions, the problem of 
nuclear risk management is far from being solved.  Indeed, the nuclear risk 
management shows two complex dimensions.  First, given the uncertainties 
involved and high aversion of the general public towards nuclear risk, a 
minimization of the risk is required through draconian safety rules.  In this 
respect, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the NEA 
(Nuclear Energy Agency),11 at the international level, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC), at the U.S. level, and the EURATOM / 
EAEC (European Atomic Energy Community), at the European level, 
exercise drastic control on operators’ installations and require the 
application of very strict safety norms.12  Regulations by these agencies aim 
 
 6. See, e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Power for Greenhouse Gas 
Mitigation, 2000. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See Borssele Nuclear Plant Definitely Staying Open Until 2033, NIS NEWS 
BULLETIN, Jan. 11, 2006, available at http://www.nisnews.nl/public/110106 _1.htm. 
 9. See World Nuclear Association, Waste Management, http://world-nuclear.org/ edu-
cation/wast.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2009). 
 10. See, e.g., World Nuclear Association, Chernobyl Accident, http://world-nuclear.org/ 
info/chernobyl/inf07.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2009). 
 11. The NEA is a specialized agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). 
 12. Of course, the norms are not only imposed at the international level by these agen-
cies but also through national safety regulations. In certain cases, standards and recom-
mendations are adopted jointly by the IAEA and other international organizations (not spe-
cifically "nuclear"), like the WHO (World Health Organization, Geneva), the ILO (Interna-
tional Labour Organization, Geneva), the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization, Roma), 
and the ICRP (International Commission on Radiological Protection, a non-governmental 
organization, London). The international conventions currently in force on this subject are 
the IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety and the IAEA Joint Convention on the Safety of 
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at avoiding, as far as possible, nuclear accidents ex ante.13  Thus, nuclear 
risk management is primarily concerned with the tools that provide nuclear 
operators incentives to internalise the risk costs in order to maximize 
prevention.  In addition, the international regime addresses the need to 
provide compensation to victims in case of accidents ex post.14  The 
obligation to provide compensation to victims is also important in the light 
of the need to internalise costs. This point is crucial, especially if 
governments are reconsidering the role of nuclear energy in future energy 
policies.  Indeed, since they generate risks for the environment and for 
human health, from an economic perspective, nuclear operators have to be 
exposed to the full risk costs that they generate.  This means that efficient 
internalisation and compensation mechanisms have to be designed to cover 
these risks.  In practice, internalisation means the integration in the 
operator’s general costs, of the costs resulting from the external effects of 
his activity.15  Many legal and economic tools (some of which result from 
international conventions) exist to reach such goals: in addition to the 
mentioned ex ante safety regulation aimed at prevention, compensation is 
addressed via civil liability rules and (partially) via the insurance market.16  
In addition, in some cases, there is government intervention in the 
compensation as well.17  The implicit market rule for an operator who 
creates a risky activity is that he assumes all risks he generates through the 
internalisation of the resulting costs.18  This rule of thumb sounds quite 
intuitive; however, nuclear operators, unexpectedly, do not seem to entirely 
follow it.  Indeed, since the development of nuclear energy in the late 
1950s, nuclear operators have benefited from a quite favourable liability 
regime that initially endeavoured to protect them and to allow the growth of 
nuclear industry.  One can, however, question whether fifty years later, this 
justification is still relevant, particularly with regard to the negative effects 
 
Spent Fuel Management and On the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, both drafted 
in Vienna respectively on June 17, 1994 and on September 5, 1997. 
 13. See, e.g., INST. OF NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS, PRINCIPLES FOR A STRONG NUCLEAR 
SAFETY CULTURE (Nov. 2004), available at http://www.nrc.gov/about-
nrc/regulatory/enforcement/INPO_PrinciplesSafetyCulture.pdf. 
 14. See, e.g., Michael Trebilcock & Ralf Winter, The Economics of Nuclear Accident 
Law, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 215 (1997). 
 15. See, e.g., Reiner Friedrich & Alfred Voss, External Costs of Energy Regulation, 21 
ENERGY POLICY 114 (Feb. 1993). 
 16. Stephen Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, INT'L REV' OF L' & ECON., 1986, at 
43-58. 
 17. See infra Section II. 
 18. See, e.g., Friedrich & Voss, supra note 15. 
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this legal regime induces in terms of incentives, compensation, and 
efficiency.  Until now, the nuclear operators have, at the international level, 
always benefited from a strong political support and from important 
subsidies.19  These subsidies are twofold.  They are relative to: 1) their civil 
liability which is limited (and so are their corresponding insurance 
premiums); and 2) to the fact that the State takes over the remaining costs.20  
As a consequence, these subsidies produce strong distortions since they 
impede the complete internalisation of the risk costs by nuclear operators.21  
Even though this subsidy for the nuclear industry was also hard to justify 
from an economic perspective when the industry stood at the beginning of 
its development, there still was large political support (and probably public 
acceptance) given industrial optimism in the 1950s and the belief in the 
promise of this new energy source.22  The political context today has, 
however, changed.  Thus, in the current context of market deregulation, 
support by the state of the nuclear industry is no longer widespread.23  
Moreover, the limited compensation to victims may no longer be accepted 
either, given increased public awareness and general sensitivity towards the 
nuclear risks.  Since the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, the 
risk of a serious nuclear accident is no longer merely hypothetical. 
Today, as far as the U.S. is concerned, the Price-Anderson Nuclear In-
dustries Indemnity Act24 has features that largely distinguish it from the in-
ternational regime.  Whereas initially the Price-Anderson Act consisted of a 
two-tier system whereby a small part was covered by the nuclear operator, 
and a much bigger part of total compensation was provided for by public 
funds, this has dramatically changed since its 1975 revision.25  Currently, 
the total amount of compensation is financed through an individual liability 
of the operator and a second collective tier financed by all licensed Ameri-
can nuclear operators through so-called retrospective premiums (and thus 
 
 19. See infra Section II. 
 20. See id. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See, e.g., President Dwight Eisenhower, Atoms for Peace, Speech Before the United 
Nations General Assembly (Dec. 8, 1953). 
 23. See, e.g., Chris Hammer, Coalition Goes Cool on Nuclear Energy Plants, THE AGE, 
Feb. 28, 2008, available at http://www.theage.com.au/news/ environment/coalition-cools-
on-nuclear-plants/2008/02/27/1203788442704.html. 
 24. Price-Anderson Act of 1957, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006). 
 25. See infra Section II(A). 
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no longer through public funding).26  The second subsidy effect (public 
funding) is hence, today, absent under the U.S. Price-Anderson Act. 
In sum, reconsidering the role of nuclear energy in future world energy 
policies stands high on the political agenda today.  This should equally lead 
to a renewal of the question of the nuclear operators’ liability in case of ac-
cidents and of the possibility to provide adequate coverage of the risks ei-
ther through insurance or through alternatives. Addressing such a question 
today is all the more relevant, since the Conventions that govern the nuclear 
operators’ civil liability regime at the international level, have recently been 
reformed.  In other words, it is necessary to re-examine the relevance of the 
current legal and economic mechanisms of internalisation and to revise the 
role of the State in this respect.  In this paper, we analyse the reform of nu-
clear liability according to the international regime using an economic 
analysis of law.  Although we will mainly focus on the international regime, 
we will briefly mention, mainly in comparison, the situation of the U.S. 
Price Anderson-Act as well.27  Some legal and economic scholars have al-
ready analysed the efficiency of the international liability regime.  In this 
respect, we notably build on the earlier work of Trebilcock and Winter28 
and Faure and Skogh.29  We will use the economic analysis of law more 
particularly to address the compensation for victims of nuclear accidents in 
France.  Focussing on one particular legal system has the advantage of ana-
lysing the subsidy and the available compensation to victims in a concrete 
manner.  However, since French law, in this respect, is based on interna-
tional conventions, our analysis clearly has implications for other legal sys-
tems with similar features as well. 
 
 26. See Omer F. Brown, II, "Legislative History of Government Indemnification Under 
the Price-Anderson Act", paper presented at The Price-Anderson Contractors Policy Issues 
Study 1–22 (Sept. 1984); See also Omer F. Brown, II, Nuclear Liability Coverage  Develop-
ments in the United States of America, Speech given at the Association Internationale Du 
Droit Nucleaire/International Nuclear Law Association, Nuclear Inter Jura Rio de Jainero 
(1993). 
 27. The reason we are not providing a detailed economic analysis of the U.S. Price-
Anderson Act is that it has been undertaken in previous research. See Michael G. Faure & 
Tom Van den Borre, Compensating Nuclear Damage: A Comparative Economic Analysis of 
the US and International Liability Schemes, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 219 
(2008). 
 28. Trebilcock & Winter, supra note 14. 
 29. Michael Faure & Göran Skogh, Compensation for Damages Caused by Nuclear Ac-
cidents: A Convention as Insurance, 17 THE GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INS. 499 (1992). 
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Our paper aims to accomplish two goals.  First, we will provide and 
overview of how the legal regimes organize the subsidy to the nuclear op-
erator.30  Next, we will estimate the amount of the subsidy of the French 
nuclear operator.  We also briefly discuss the calculations of the subsidy 
under the U.S. Price Anderson Act.  This will permit us to corroborate our 
further arguments with empirical data.31 Then, we will analyse the implica-
tions of the current legal regime in terms of incentives, compensation, effi-
ciency, that is, in terms of internalisation of the risk costs.  This will high-
light the obvious distortions of such a regime.32 
II.  THE IMPLICIT SUBSIDY OF THE NUCLEAR OPERATOR 
A.   A Largely Favourable International Legal Regime 
Implementing a legal liability regime for nuclear operators was per-
ceived very early as a priority.  Indeed, the first nuclearized countries rap-
idly understood the importance of setting up a legal framework to manage 
nuclear accidents from a prevention (ex ante) and compensation (ex post) 
viewpoint.33  Hitherto, in many European States, the legislation relative to 
nuclear civil liability is governed by various international conventions.34  
The first one, the Paris Convention signed on July 29, 1960, was drafted 
within the framework of the NEA by the OECD.35  Its formal goal was to 
provide adequate and fair compensation to victims of damages caused by 
nuclear accidents.36  Ratified by fifteen European countries, it was then 
completed on January 31, 1963, by a second Convention, the Brussels Con-
vention, which was ratified by twelve countries / parties to the Paris Con-
vention.37  A second regime came into being through the already mentioned 
UN-related IAEA. Within this framework, the Vienna Convention, relative 
to the civil liability for nuclear damages, was drafted and ratified on May 
21, 1963, by thirty-two countries from South America, Eastern Europe, and 
 
 30. See infra Part II. 
 31. See infra Part III. 
 32. See infra Part IV. 
 33. See, e.g., Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 
29, 1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 251 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
 34. E.g., id. 
 35. See id. 
 36. Paris Convention, supra note 33, preamble. 
 37. Convention Supplementary to the 1960 Convention on Third Party Liability in the 
Field of Nuclear Energy, Jan. 31, 1963, 956 U.N.T.S. 265. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/5
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Asia.38  Some States are party to the NEA regime, others to the Vienna 
Convention. A Common Protocol to all the Conventions was signed in 1988 
after the Chernobyl accident to coordinate the scope of application of both 
Conventions.39  These international treaties are implemented in the national 
laws of the signatory States.  Within the limits set by the Conventions, the 
States benefit from autonomous room to manoeuvre.40  In France, these 
Conventions are integrated in Law No.68-943, passed on October 30, 
196841 (modified by Law No. 90-488 of June 16, 1990).42 
Civil liability is a legal regime that, from an economic perspective, 
aims at internalising the costs of a damaging risk to third parties by inciting 
the potential actor to prevention.  This is a standard insight of the economic 
analysis of law since the early works of Calabresi,43 Brown,44 and Shav-
ell.45  A basic notion is that the injurer should be fully exposed to damage 
costs in order to provide him with the necessary incentives for prevention.46  
In this respect, the current international legal regime of nuclear civil liabil-
ity is, however, quite unsatisfying.  Indeed, since the beginning of nucleari-
sation, the choice was made to implement a strict, channelled, and limited 
civil liability rule.47  All of these characteristics of the liability regime have 
already been addressed from an economic perspective in the literature.  The 
principle of strict liability holds liable the nuclear operator irrespective of 
his behaviour; there is no need for the victim to prove the fault or negli-
 
 38. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 1063 
U.N.T.S. 265. 
 39. Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris 
Convention, Sept. 21, 1988, IAEA doc. GOV/2326 Annex I, reprinted in 42 NUCLEAR L. 
BULL. 56 (1988). 
 40. Thus, States would be allowed to provide more compensation than the amounts laid 
down in the Conventions. 
 41. Law No. 68-943 of Oct. 30, 1968, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], Oct. 30, 1968. 
 42. Law No. 90-488 of June 16, 1990, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], June 16, 1990. 
 43. Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE 
L. J. 499 (1961); Guido Calabresi, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS (1970). 
 44. J. P. Brown, Toward an Economic theory of Liability, 2 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 323. 
 45. Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466 
(1980) [hereinafter Shavell, Breach of Contract]; Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Non-
monetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 584 (1987) [hereinafter Shavell, 
Nonmonetary Sanctions]. 
 46. See, e.g., Trebilcock & Winter, supra note 14. 
 47. See, e.g., Paris Convention, supra note 33. 
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gence of the operator.48  It is a quite common rule used to manage catastro-
phic risks.49  The economic rationale is that in these so-called unilateral ac-
cident cases (where only one party, the operator, can influence the accident 
risk) only strict liability leads to a full internalisation of the accident risk.50  
This rule will indeed provide the operator not only with the incentive to fol-
low optimal care but also to adopt an efficient activity level.51  There is a 
requirement, however, that there is full solvency of the injurer or that the 
insolvency risk is in some way taken care of (e.g. by insurance).52  Chan-
nelled liability means that the nuclear operator will be exclusively liable in 
case of accidents.53  The formal justification for channelling is that it avoids 
the multiplication of procedures against constructors, suppliers or sub-
contractors and thus, makes lawsuits for victims easier.54  This rule is, how-
ever, debatable from an economic perspective, more particularly since 
channelling excludes liability of others who could have contributed to the 
accident risk as well.55  Finally, an element quite interesting for our analysis 
is the liability limitation.  Indeed, in the international regime, the operator’s 
nuclear civil liability is limited at two levels: in time and in amount. 
 
 48. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, strict liability (8th ed. 2004). 
 49. See  M. A. de Figueiredo, D. M. Reiner & H. J. Herzog, Framing the Long-Term In 
Situ Liability Issue for Geologic Carbon Storage in the United States, 10 MITIGATION AND 
ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 647 (2005). 
 50. See Trebilcock & Winter, supra note 14, at 221-25. 
 51. See Shavell, Breach of Contract, supra note 45. 
 52. Stephen Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, INT'L REV' OF L' & ECON., 1986 at 
43-58. 
 53. The only exceptions is the situation when the operator would be able to prove that 
the accident results from an intentional fault of one of his partners or when the damages are 
directly due to “an act of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or. . . a grave 
natural disaster of an exceptional character.” Paris Convention, supra note 33, Art. 9; see 
also id. Art. 6(e). 
 54. See, e.g., Michael G. Faure & Karine Fiore, The Civil Liability of European Nuclear 
Operators: Which Coverage for the New 2004 Protocols? Evidence from France, 8 INT'L 
ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL., L. & ECON. 227 (2008). 
 55. Ton Van den Borre, Channelling of Liability: a Few Juridical and Economic Views 
on an Inadequate Legal Construction, in CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NUCLEAR 
ENERGY LAW: HARMONISING LEGISLATION IN CEEC/NIS 13-39; Michael Faure & Ton 
Hartlief, Remedies for Expanding Liability, 18 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 681 (1998). 
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The time limit means that the victims must bring a suit for compensa-
tion against the nuclear operator within a prescription delay of thirty years 
after the accident in case of death or individual damages and within a pre-
scription delay of ten years for other damages.56  Through this first limit, 
the legislator estimated that beyond these delays, the causality link between 
the damage and the accident would be too hard to establish.57 
The second liability limitation, the most relevant for our analysis, con-
cerns the financial cap on liability. Indeed, in pursuance of the Conventions, 
the nuclear operator engages his civil liability in case of an accident only up 
to a certain amount.58  This amount was first fixed by the Paris Convention 
in 1960, and has been modified many times since.  For example, before the 
last modification Protocol of the Paris and Brussels Conventions,59 the 
French operator’s liability limit was fixed at € ninety-one million.60  Now, 
this cap amounts to € 700 million61 but this latest Protocol has not entered 
into force yet.62 
 
 56. See Paris Convention, supra note 33, Art. 8. 
 57. See, e.g., Mark Tetley, Revised Paris and Vienna Nuclear Liability Conventions – 
Challenges for Nuclear Insurers, 77 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 27, 30 (2006). 
 58. See Paris Convention, supra note 33, art. 7. 
 59. The modification Protocol of the Paris and Brussels Convention on Nuclear Civil 
Liability was drafted on February 12, 2004, at the OECD head office, in Paris.  See Protocol 
to Amend the Convention of 31 January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29 
July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, as Amended by the Addi-
tional Protocol of 28 January 1964 and the Protocol of 16 November 1982, Feb. 12, 2004, 
available at http://www.nea.fr/html/law/brussels_supplementary_convention.pdf [hereinafter 
2004 Protocol]. 
 60. See generally Karine Fiore, The Nuclear Liability Limit in the OECD Conventions: 
An Implicit Subsidy, 2008, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=1086290. 
 61. See 2004 Protocol, supra note 59, art. 3(b)(i). This high increase of the liability cap 
might obviously have consequences in terms of internalisation. We will come back to this 
fact. See infra Section III. 
 62. According to article 20 of the Protocol, "[the new amendments] shall come into force 
when ratified, accepted or approved by two-thirds of the Contracting Parties. For each Con-
tracting Party ratifying, accepting or approving thereafter, they shall come into force at the 
date of such ratification, acceptance or approval." 2004 Protocol, supra note 59, art. 20. The 
"reasonable delay" deadline to ratify the Protocol was fixed by the Council of the European 
Union at the December 31, 2006.  See 2004 O.J. (L 097) 53. 
9
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Beyond this limit, the Brussels Convention provides a complementary 
mechanism of compensation based on public funds, for cases where the 
amounts fixed by the Paris Conventions would be insufficient.63  For this 
matter, it adds two risk layers beyond the operator’s liability limit.  Indeed, 
at a national level, if the operator liability cap is not sufficient to compen-
sate victims and to repair the damages of a nuclear accident, the State inside 
which the accident occurred must finance reparations up to a certain limit.64  
In French Nuclear Law, this limit is fixed at € 140 million.65  Note that this 
second amount has also been increased by the last modification Protocol of 
the Paris and Brussels Conventions to € 500 million, but it has not entered 
into force yet.66  At a supranational level, a third risk layer is enacted by the 
Conventions.  If the operator’s and State’s financing are still insufficient, 
the States party to the Conventions must cover the exceeding damages up to 
€ 150 million, on a solidarity basis.67  The 2004 Protocol increased this 
limit to € 300 million.68 
 
 63. See Convention of 31st January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29th 
July 1960, as amended by the additional Protocol of 28th January 1964 and by the Protocol 
of 16th November 1982, art. 3, Jan. 31, 1963 [hereinafter Brussels Convention]. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See Fiore, supra note 60, at 2. 
 66. See 2004 Protocol, supra note 59, art. 3(b)(ii). 
 67. See Fiore, supra note 60, at 2. 
 68. See 2004 Protocol, supra note 59, art. 3(b)(iii). 
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The respective coverage caps before69 and after the 2004 amend-
ments70 are summed up in Table 1.  
 
 69. Before 2004, in the article 3 (a) & (b) of Brussels Convention, these different cover-
age caps are enacted as follows: 
(a) Under the conditions established by this Convention, the Contracting Parties 
undertake that compensation in respect of the damage referred to in Article 2 
shall be provided up to the amount of 300 million Special Drawing Rights per 
incident; b) Such compensation shall be provided: i) up to an amount of at least 
5 million Special Drawing Rights, out of funds provided by insurance or other 
financial security, such amount to be established by the legislation of the Con-
tracting Party in whose territory the nuclear installation of the operator liable is 
situated; ii) between this amount and 175 million Special Drawing Rights, out 
of public funds to be made available by the Contracting Party in whose territory 
the nuclear installation of the operator liable is situated; iii) between 175 and 
300 million Special Drawing Rights, out of public funds to be made available 
by the Contracting Parties according to the formula for contributions specified 
in Article 12. 
Brussels Convention, supra note 63, art. 3(a)-(b). 
 70. The 2004 Protocol amended the article 3 (a) & (b) of the Brussels Convention as fol-
lows: 
(a) Under the conditions established by this Convention, the Contracting Parties 
undertake that compensation in respect of nuclear damage referred to in Article 
2 shall be provided up to the amount of 1 500 million euro per nuclear incident, 
subject to the application of Article 12bis; b) Such compensation shall be pro-
vided as follows: i) up to an amount of at least 700 million euro, out of funds 
provided by insurance or other financial security or out of public funds pro-
vided pursuant to Article 10(c) of the Paris Convention, such amount to be es-
tablished under the legislation of the Contracting Party in whose territory the 
nuclear installation of the operator liable is situated, and to be distributed, up to 
700 million euro, in accordance with the Paris Convention; ii) between the 
amount referred to in paragraph (b)(i) of this Article and 1 200 million euro, 
out of public funds to be made available by the Contracting Party in whose ter-
ritory the nuclear installation of the operator liable is situated; iii) between 1 
200 million euro and 1 500 million euro, out of public funds to be made avail-
able by the Contracting Parties according to the formula for contributions re-
ferred to in Article 12, subject to such amount being increased in accordance 
with the mechanism referred to in Article 12 bis. 
2004 Protocol, supra note 59, art. 3(a)-(b). 
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Paris (1960) and Brussels 
Conventions (1963) 
(French Example) 
Modification Protocol of the 
Paris and Brussels 
Conventions (2004) 
Operator’s Liability Cap  91 700 
State’s Intervention 140 500 
Contracting Parties  
Coverage 
150 300 
TOTAL 381 1500 
 
Table 1. The different coverage caps before and after the Conventions 2004 
amendments (in million €) 
 
This legal regime is very peculiar. Indeed, it makes the national 
nuclear operator benefit from a subsidy.  This subsidy comes from its civil 
liability limit.  This limit creates a bias against the internalisation of the risk 
costs by the operator because this latter internalises these costs (and covers 
them) only up to the amount fixed by the Conventions, and thus only 
partially.  Therefore, it is implicitly admitted that if a nuclear accident costs 
more than this limit (which is more than probable), the operator will not 
provide complete compensation to the victims.  This regime thus protects 
the nuclear operator and artificially decreases its risk costs.  Furthermore, 
we mentioned before that beyond the operator liability cap, the State 
intervenes to cover a second risk layer.  Doing so, the State pays for the 
reparations that the nuclear operator does not pay, and does not have to pay, 
pursuant to the Conventions.  It thus directly contributes to the lack of 
internalisation of the risk costs by the operator since it intervenes ex nihilo 
to cover the risk instead of him.  The State substitutes for the nuclear 
operator on this second risk layer, without making the operator pay any 
price for this financing.  We will address below the distortions created by 
this subsidy, but first, let us compare this subsidy briefly with the situation 
in the U.S. and then examine what the magnitude of the subsidy is. 
B.  Compensation in the Price-Anderson Act 
Even though we stressed in the introduction that our analysis mainly 
focuses on the subsidy granted to the nuclear industry resulting from the in-
ternational liability regime, a brief discussion of the U.S. Price-Anderson 
Act is interesting, especially to show that in the U.S. it was apparently pos-
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/5
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sible to construct a regime which is far less distorting than the international 
regime. 
Initially the Price-Anderson Act, just like the international compensa-
tion regime, limited private liability (up to $60 million).71  In addition, the 
government agreed to make an amount of $500 million available.72  At the 
time it was passed the Price-Anderson Act surely created a favourable cli-
mate for the nuclear American industry.73  Also, originally in the U.S. a 
large part of the compensation was awarded through public funds.  This, 
however, changed in 1975 when the public intervention was replaced by a 
second tier of compensation financed by all American nuclear operators 
through so-called retrospective premiums.74  A second change took place in 
1975, whereby the individual liability of the nuclear operator was increased 
to $160 million and the retrospective premiums in the second tier were 
raised to $400 million.75  As a result, in 1982, the total amount of compen-
sation under the Price-Anderson Act was $560 million.76 In fact, it was the 
same as at the start of the Price-Anderson Act in 1957, with the difference 
that it was entirely financed by private funds.  The most recent amendments 
to the Price-Anderson Act took place in 2005, as a result of the 2005 En-
ergy Policy Act.77 Currently, the liability of the individual operator is $300 
million.78  The amount currently available in the second tier is $95.8 mil-
lion, plus 5% for legal costs per reactor.79  Since in 2005, 104 reactors were 
operating, the total amount available was $300 million in the first tier + ($ 
95.8 + 5% x $ 95.8) x 104 operators = $10.461 billion for the second tier. In 
total, this constitutes an amount of $10.761 billion.  This can be as follows: 
 
 
 71. See Price-Anderson Act, § 4, Public Law 85-256, 71 Stat. 576, 576-77 (1957) (re-
quiring financial protection as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission saw fit); see also Barry 
P. Brownstein, The Price-Anderson Act: Is It Consistent sith [sic] a Sound Energy Policy?, 
36 CATO POL'Y ANALYSIS (Apr. 17, 1984), available at http://www.cato.org/ 
pubs/pas/pa036.html. 
 72. § 4(d), 71 Stat. 577. 
 73. SAMUEL D. ESTEP, WILLIAM J. PIERCE & E. BLYTHE STASON, ATOMS AND THE LAW 
780 (1959). 
 74. See Act of December 31, 1975, Public Law 94-197, 89 Stat 1111. 
 75. See id; see also NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, PRICE-ANDERSON ACT PROVIDES 
EFFECTIVE LIABILITY INSURANCE AT NO COST TO PUBLIC 2 (2007), available at 
http://www.nei.org/filefolder/price-anderson_0707.pdf. 
 76. See Tetly, supra note 57. 
 77. Energy Policy Act, Pub.Law. No. 109–58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005). See also NUCLEAR 
ENERGY AGENCY, Legislative updates, in 23.2 NEA NEWS 32 (2005). 
 78. See Legislative updates, supra note 77. 
 79. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b)(1), (o)(1) (2009). 
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Schematic overview of Price-Anderson Act Compensation  
(in million dollars) 
Year  Individual  
liability  
nuclear  
operator 
Additional funding Total amount 
available 
  Government  
indemnity 
Retrospective  
premium 
 
1957 60 500 - 560 
1982 160 0 400 560 
2005 300 0 10, 461 10,761 
 
Table 2. Schematic overview of Compensation under the Price-Anderson Act 
III.   CALCULATING THE NUCLEAR SUBSIDY 
A. The Level of the Nuclear Subsidy Under the International Regime 
The French nuclear subsidy is, as in other countries, related to the op-
erator’s liability limit.  As mentioned, in accordance with the International 
Convention requirements, a French nuclear operator must cover the risks he 
generates up to his liability cap.  This coverage is compulsory under the 
Paris Convention.80  In French Nuclear Law, the liability cap of the nuclear 
operator is currently fixed at € 91 million,81 and EDF (Electricité de 
France), the French nuclear operator, meets its coverage obligation in two 
distinct ways.  For two-thirds, it guarantees it by its financial provisions (up 
to € 60 million) and for one-third, it purchases insurance (up to € 31 mil-
lion).82  As his civil liability is limited to € 91 million, the French nuclear 
operator benefits from a subsidy equal to the part of the accident costs 
which would exceed this limit. 
Furthermore, we noticed that this financial limit is completed by a sec-
ond level: the State intervention.  Today, this assistance is still limited to a 
maximum of € 140 million and takes place only if the operator liability cap 
is insufficient to cover all the accident damages. The State thus intervenes 
 
 80. See Paris Convention, supra note 33, art. 10. 
 81. Law No. 68-943 of Oct. 30, 1968, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], Oct. 30, 1968 (amended by Law No. 90-488 of June 16, 1990, 
Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], June 16, 
1990). 
 82. This insurance is contracted through a pool of insurers, Assuratome (with AGF and 
AXA), and the European mutual ELINI.  See Fiora, supra note 60, at 4 n.9. 
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for the layer of damages between € 91 million and € 231 million.  This as-
sistance is hardly justifiable economically and is, from an efficiency view-
point, quite unsatisfying.  As we will do for the global subsidy, it is interest-
ing to measure the magnitude of this assistance as well.  Since this interven-
tion refers to the damages between € 91 million and € 231 million, it is in-
cluded in the global subsidy (which concerns the damages exceeding € 91 
million).  As a result, the subsidy refers to the part of the non-internalised 
risk costs by the operator within which a part is covered by the State (the 
remaining part being neither internalised nor covered nationally). 
Although both of these caps are still the applied caps, we mentioned 
that the Paris and Brussels Conventions have recently revised them upward.  
More precisely, the operator financial cap has been increased up to € 700 
million and the State’s up to € 500 million.83 
In this respect, it was of prime importance for our analysis to integrate 
these changes in the evaluation of the subsidy.  Indeed, in a previous paper, 
Fiore attempted to evaluate the French nuclear subsidy,84 relying on the 
works of Heyes and Liston-Heyes85 about the U.S. nuclear liability subsidy 
in response to Dubin and Rothwell86 and of Heyes and Liston-Heyes87 on 
the Canadian nuclear liability subsidy.88  The results are instructive.  We 
will not review the mathematical proof within the scope of this paper, but 
merely present the results.  In brief, to calculate the subsidy, Fiore fitted a 
curve (a function of probability density f) relating the magnitude of a nu-
clear accident (in terms of off-site damages) to its probability of occurrence 
(assessed by expertise studies). For this, she relied on four scenarios for the 
evaluation of the “worst-case” damages (noted Ci=  {10,000;  40,000;  
70,000;  100,000} million €) given by the different expertise studies 
(DGEMP Report;89 Schieber and Schneider;90 Spadaro and Rabl;91 Dubin 
 
 83. See 2004 Protocol, supra note 59, arts. 3(b)(i) & (ii). 
 84. Karine Fiore, The subsidy of the French nuclear power: An empirical analysis of the 
Paris and Brussels Conventions liability limit (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author). 
 85. Anthony G. Heyes & Catherine Liston-Heyes, Subsidy to Nuclear Power through 
Price-Anderson Liability Limit: Comment, 16 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 122. 
 86. Jeffrey A. Dubin A & Geoffrey S. Rothwell, Subsidy to nuclear power through 
Price-Anderson liability limit, 8 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 73. 
 87. Anthony G. Heyes & Catherine Liston-Heyes, An empirical analysis of the Nuclear 
Liability Act (1970) in Canada, 22 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 91. 
 88. Below we will briefly provide a summary of these findings, calculating the subsidy 
under the U.S. Price-Anderson Act as well.  See infra Section 2.4. 
 89. Gen. Directorate for Energy & Raw Materials [DGEMP], Les coûts de référence de 
la production électrique (2003). 
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and Rothwell)92 and on the different corresponding probabilities.  As a nu-
clear accident is generated by the reactor core meltdown,93 Fiore retained 
the three probabilities generally estimated by the experts for this phenome-
non, P1=10-4, P2=10-5 and P3=10-6.  Refining Dubin et al.’s methodology, 
she relevantly added conditional probabilities, that is, probabilities that re-
veal the seriousness of the accident resulting from the reactor core melt-
down.  These probabilities are of two levels.  The different Probability Risk 
Assessment (PRA) studies conducted in several countries generally esti-
mate them at P1=0.81 for “minor” or “medium” accidents (release out of 
the reactor of 0.1% of inert gases and of 0.01% of the most volatile ele-
ments) and P2= 0.19 for “major” accidents (more important releases).94  In 
other words, in 8 / 10 of nuclear accidents, radioactive releases are consid-
ered weak (this refers to accidents which would cost less than € 500 mil-
lion) and in 2 / 10, they are estimated to be higher and even of major scope 
(this refers to “major” accidents which might cost several billion €).  The 
differences between these probabilities reflect the quantity of the radioac-
tive rejections emitted after an accident, and thus its magnitude.  In order to 
make the evaluation of the nuclear subsidy realistic and to provide an accu-
rate estimation of the different levels of risk of a nuclear accident, these 
conditional probabilities must be multiplied by the probabilities of the reac-
tor core melt P1 and P2. Appropriately, Fiore used the probability P2= 0.19 
to evaluate the subsidy corresponding to her “worst-case” scenarios (major 
accidents), going from damages of € 10,000 million to damages of € 
100,000 million. 
 
 90. C. Schieber & T. Schneider, Valorisation monétaire des impacts sanitaires et envi-
ronnementaux d'un accident nucléaire: Synthèse des études ExternE, intérêts et limites de 
développements complémentaires, (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.cepn.asso.fr/ 
pdf/Rap_Res/R275%20res.pdf. 
 91. J.V. Spadaro & A. Rabl, External costs of energy: application of the ExternE meth-
odology in France, Final Report for Contract JOS3-CT95-0010 (1998). 
 92. Jeffrey A. Dubin & Geoffrey S. Rothwell, Risk and reactor safety systems adoption, 
42 J. OF ECONOMETRICS 201. 
 93. We exclude from our analysis the accidents resulting from human mistakes or from 
external events (natural catastrophes or hostilities) since these events are not foreseeable and 
thus cannot be affected by a probability. 
 94. Christian Bataille & Robert Galley , Rapport sur l'aval du cycle nucléaire, Tome II : 
Les coûts de production de l’électricité, Chapitre III,   Rep. No. de l'Assemblée Nationale 
1359 (1999), available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/rap-oecst/nucleaire/r1359-
15.asp; NUCLEAR ENERGY ASSOCIATION, POWER GENERATION CHOICES: COSTS, RISKS AND 
EXTERNALITIES, OCDE, PARIS, FRANCE; US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1990), 
SEVERE ACCIDENT RISKS: AN ASSESSMENT FOR FIVE US NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS,  1 
NUREG-1150 (1994) (final summary report). 
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With these data, Fiore found the following values for the French nu-
clear subsidy:95 
 
 p1 =10-4 ; ps= 0.19 p2 =10-5 ; p2 = 0.19 P3 =10-6 ; p2 = 0.19 
Cost of major  
accidents R1=5% R2=10% R1=5% R2=10% R1=5% R2=10% 
C1 = 10,000  0.67 0.650 0.290 0.280 0.150 0.140 
C2 = 40,000  1.69 1.670 0.610 0.590 0.530 0.490 
C3 = 70,000  2.56 2.500 0.880 0.850 0.650 0.630 
C4 = 100,000  3.3 3.200 1.090 1.010 0.870 0.830 
 
Table 3. The values of the current French nuclear subsidy (in million € reac-
tor year) according to the scenarios 
 
Ri=(R1; R2) stands for the share of the risk aversion premium in the to-
tal insurance premium 
 
 
Table 4. The values of the French nuclear subsidy (in million € reactor year) 
according to the scenarios integrating the 2004 Protocol 
 
These amounts stand for the additional costs the French operator 
would have to bear if he himself had to cover all his risk costs through in-
surance. 
As Fiore96 explains, these results show that the amounts of the subsidy 
are quite important.  For the French nuclear park as a whole (fifty-nine reac-
tors), the total subsidy spreads from 8.12 to 191.4 million € / year before 
2004 and from 1.1 to 162.4 million € / year after 2004. 
 
 95. For more details on the methodology and mathematical proof, see Heyes & Liston-
Heyes, supra note 85; see also Dubin & Rothwell, supra note 86. 
 96. Fiore, supra note 84. 
 p1  =10-4 ; p2 = 0.19 p2 =10-5; p2 = 0.19 p3  =10-6; p2 = 0.19 
Cost of major  
accidents R1=5% R2=10% R1=5% R2=10% R1=5% R2=10% 
C1 = 10,000  0.320 0.310 0.080 0.079 0.020 0.019 
C2 = 40,000  1.230 1.220 0.315 0.310 0.250 0.230 
C3 = 70,000  2.040 1.900 0.540 0.530 0.360 0.350 
C4 = 100,000  2.800 2.700 0.730 0.670 0.540 0.510 
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In sum, with the new Protocol, the French nuclear subsidy decreases at 
an average rate of 44.2%.  Therefore, with the new caps, the operator will 
bear more risk costs but the State will keep on covering a large part of the 
risk, and a much bigger part (from € 140 million to € 500 million).  Thus, 
we can say that the global assessment of the 2004 Protocol in terms of sub-
sidy reduction is positive in the sense that the operator will be exposed to 
damage costs to a substantially higher degree. However, it is not sufficient.  
The subsidy remains quite high, that is, a significant part of the risk costs 
keeps on being non-internalised. 
B. The Level of the Nuclear Subsidy in the Price-Anderson Act 
Above, we stated that the structure of the compensation regime in the 
Price-Anderson Act in the U.S. is remarkably different from the compensa-
tion regime at the international level: the total amount of compensation 
available to victims in the U.S. is substantially higher than in the interna-
tional regime and State intervention in the U.S. is excluded.  Earlier studies 
of the Price-Anderson Act have also examined what the scope of the sub-
sidy to the nuclear industry was.  First, we should mention that as far as the 
situation under the Price-Anderson Act of 1957, was concerned (where the 
operator was only liable for $60 million but the government provided addi-
tional funds for $500 million), the NRC argued that the Price-Anderson Act 
provided a real subsidy to the industry, but that its magnitude was difficult 
to estimate.97  In addition, Dubin and Rothwell estimated the cumulative 
value of the subsidy to industry (in 1985 dollars) to be $110 billion by 
1988, and growing to $131 billion by 2001.98  Later, Rothwell argued that, 
in economic terms, it is not a direct subsidy in the sense that there is no di-
rect payment made by government to anyone; at the same time he argues 
that there is a ‘potential (or expected) subsidy.’99  As we stated above, the 
Price-Anderson Act has been revised many times, taking into account, inter 
alia, the possibilities for the operator to obtain coverage on the insurance 
market.  Today, the U.S. nuclear operator is individually liable for $300 
million and in the second layer, an additional amount, is available of 
$10.461 billion, making the total amount available $10.761 billion.100 
 
 97. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT: THE THIRD 
DECADE G–12 (1983). 
 98. See, e.g., Dubin & Rothwell, supra note 86; Heyes & Liston-Heyes, supra note 85. 
 99. Geoffrey S. Rothwell, Does the US Subsidize Nuclear Power Insurance?, STAN. 
INSTI. FOR ECON. POL'Y RES. (Jan. 2002), available at http://siepr.stanford.edu/publications 
profile/927. 
 100. See supra Table 2. 
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Without analysing the subsidy under the U.S. Price-Anderson Act in 
detail, the question can, of course, be asked whether the total available 
amount in case of a nuclear incident in the U.S. today will be sufficient to 
cover the costs of an average nuclear incident. That depends to a large ex-
tent on the estimates of the costs of a nuclear accident.  In the literature, 
various scenarios are described, whereby the damages range from $10 bil-
lion to $100 billion.101  Depending upon the scenario one follows, there 
could potentially still be accidents of which the damage is substantially 
higher than the compensation available under today’s Price-Anderson re-
gime.  Before the 2005 change, the literature concluded that there was in-
deed a subsidy resulting from the financial limit on the liability of the op-
erator in the Price-Anderson Act,102 but depending upon the scenario, this 
may still be the case today. 
Hence, for both the international regime, as well as for the U.S. Price-
Anderson Act, it is interesting to examine what the potential consequences 
are of the nuclear subsidy.  Indeed, to the extent that accidents can occur of 
which the magnitude is higher than the limited amount of compensation 
available under both regimes there still is an (implicit) subsidy. 
IV.  THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE LIABILITY 
SUBSIDY TO THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 
The inefficiencies created by a nuclear subsidy, as described in this 
paper, are of three kinds. Firstly, it might generate an artificial competitive-
ness of nuclear energy.  Secondly, it may not provide the sufficient incen-
tives to the operator to prevent nuclear accidents.  Thirdly, the compensa-
tion capacity for the victims in case of an accident is made clearly deficient. 
A.   An Artificial Competitiveness of Nuclear Energy 
The default of internalisation of the risk costs by the nuclear operator 
creates a bias in favour of the competitiveness of his activity because all the 
costs are not reflected in the kWh price. This argument is a classic embodi-
ment of the theory of market failures and the theory of externalities,103 ac-
cording to which, all the costs generated by an economic activity must be 
integrated into the sale price.  On the one hand, this permits the producer to 
 
 101. See supra section 2.3; See supra notes 85 & 86. 
 102. See Rothwell, supra note 99. 
 103. See, e.g., ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (8th ed. 1920); ARTHUR C. 
PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920); Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. 
OF L. AND ECON 1 (1960). 
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recover his costs and to guarantee a minimal profitability.  On the other 
hand, the price becomes an information vector and a signal for consumers. 
In regard to the large part of risk costs non-internalised by the nuclear 
operator, it looks as if the observed competitiveness of his activity is, thus, 
artificial.  Indeed, since he does not internalise the whole risk costs, the nu-
clear operator integrates these costs only partially in the nuclear kWh price 
and so passes them on the consumers only partly.  As a result, the nuclear 
kWh price is artificially low and sends a wrong signal to final consumers. 
This might have two main consequences. First, the consumption of nuclear 
energy is not at its optimal level; it is “over-optimal.”  It is higher than it 
would be if the kWh price reflected the risk costs as a whole (and thus was 
increased).  Secondly, this artificial competitiveness of nuclear energy 
might stifle the demand for alternative energy sources which, thus, appear 
much less attractive. 
Accordingly, one can wonder what would be the impact of the com-
plete internalisation of the risk costs on the operator’s profitability.  In other 
words, one can wonder whether this internalisation would be financially 
sustainable for the energy producer or not.  We can estimate such an impact 
of the subsidy under the international regime, taking the example of France 
and its (monopolistic) operator of the fifty-nine nuclear reactors in France, 
EDF.  We take as a financial indicator the EDF’s average annual benefit 
from EDF’s financial reports from 2000; that is, € 1.7 billion.104  Therefore, 
the value of the supplementary costs (measured by the nuclear subsidy) to 
this benefit can be calculated in the following tables according to the sce-
narios: 
 
 104. The annual benefits (in billion €) are: 1.141 in 2000, 0.841 in 2001, 0.481 in 2002, 
0.857 in 2003, 1.3 in 2004, 3.2 in 2005 and 5.6 in 2006. 
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 p1 =10-4 ; p2 = 0.19 p2 =10-5 ; p2 = 0.19 p3 =10-6 ; p2 = 0.19 
Cost of Major  
Accidents 
R1=5% R2=10% R1=5% R2=10% R1=5% R2=10% 
C1 = 10,000  2.29% 2.22% 0.99% 0.96% 0.51% 0.48% 
C2 = 40,000  5.77% 5.70% 2.08% 2.01% 1.81% 1.67% 
C3 = 70,000  8.73% 8.53% 3.00% 2.90% 2.22% 2.15% 
C4 = 100,000  11.26% 10.92% 3.72% 3.45% 2.97% 2.83% 
 
Table 5. Share of the implicit subsidy to the average EDF’s annual benefit be-
fore 2004 
 
 P1 =10-4 ; p2 = 0.19 p2 =10-5 ; p2 = 0.19 P3 =10-6 ; p2 = 0.19 
Cost of Major ac-
cidents 
R1=5% R2=10% R1=5% R2=10% R1=5% R2=10% 
C1 = 10,000  1.09% 1.06% 0.27% 0.27% 0.07% 0.06% 
C2 = 40,000  4.20% 4.16% 1.07% 1.06% 0.85% 0.78% 
C3 = 70,000  6.96% 6.48% 1.84% 1.81% 1.23% 1.19% 
C4 = 100,000  9.55% 9.21% 2.49% 2.29% 1.84% 1.74% 
 
Table 6. Share of the implicit subsidy to the average EDF’s annual benefit af-
ter 2004 
 
According to the scenarios, EDF’s subsidy stands for between 0.48% 
and 11.26% of its average annual benefit before 2004, and between 0.06% 
and 9.55% thereafter.  These ratios are instructive because the full coverage 
of the risk by the operator seems to be financially sustainable.  Therefore, if 
the French operator covered all of his risk costs in the current situation, he 
would then pass on his supplementary costs to the consumers.  Hence, a 
relevant question is – What would the price be of the unsubsidised nuclear 
kWh?  This evaluation can be carried out in several ways.  An estimate of 
this impact can be done as follows: dividing the values found for the sub-
sidy by the average number of kWh produced yearly by a nuclear plant in 
France.  We then obtain the proportion of the subsidy (and thus the costs to 
pass on) per kWh per year. Knowing that a French nuclear plant (of an av-
erage capacity of 1000 MW) produces about 7 billion kWh / year, the im-
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pact on the nuclear kWh price of the internalisation of the risk costs before 
and after 2004 are given in the following Tables:105 
 
 p1 =10-4 ; p2 = 0,19 p2 =10-5 ; p2 = 0,19 P3 =10-6 ; p2 = 0,19 
Cost of Major 
accidents R1=5% R2=10% R1=5% R2=10% R1=5% R2=10% 
C1 = 10,000  0.0000957 0.0000929 0.0000414 0.0000400 0.0000214 0.0000200 
C2 = 40,000  0.0002414 0.0002386 0.0000871 0.0000843 0.0000757 0.0000700 
C3 = 70,000  0.0003657 0.0003571 0.0001257 0.0001214 0.0000929 0.0000900 
C4 = 100,000  0.0004714 0.0004571 0.0001557 0.0001443 0.0001243 0.0001186 
 
Table 7. Share of the subsidy per kWh/year (in €) before 2004 
 
 p1 =10-4 ; p2 = 0,19 p2 =10-5 ; p2 = 0,19 P3 =10-6 ; p2 = 0,19 
Cost of Major 
accidents 
R1=5% R2=10% R1=5% R2=10% R1=5% R2=10% 
C1 = 10,000  0.0000457 0.0000443 0.0000114 0.0000113 0.0000029 0.0000027 
C2 = 40,000  0.0001757 0.0001743 0.0000450 0.0000443 0.0000357 0.0000329 
C3 = 70,000  0.0002914 0.0002714 0.0000771 0.0000757 0.0000514 0.0000500 
C4 = 100,000  0.0004000 0.0003857 0.0001043 0.0000957 0.0000771 0.0000729 
 
Table 8. Share of the subsidy per kWh/year (in €) after 2004 
 
As expected, this calculation confirms our previous conclusion.  In-
deed, the nuclear kWh price currently amounts to € 0.03 and nuclear power 
is one the most competitive energy sources (see Table 9). 
 
 
 105. Fiore, supra note 84. 
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Energy Sources kWh production cost (€) 
Nuclear Energy 0,03 
Coal 0,0337 
Gas 0,035 
Hydraulic 0,04 
Fuel 0,05 
Wind 0,06 
Geothermic 0,06 
Biomass 0,10 
Solar 0,15 
 
Table 9. KWh production cost of the main power sources in 2008 
 
If we look at the Table 7 and 8 results, the impact of the implicit sub-
sidy, that is of the full coverage of the risk costs by the operator, is weak 
and the nuclear kWh remains competitive.  Without the implicit subsidy, it 
would amount between € 0.03002 and € 0.0004714 before the 2004 Proto-
col and between € 0.0300027 and € 0.0304 after.  That means that the price 
would be negligibly affected. 
The result is that the full coverage of the risk cost by the French nu-
clear operator would be financially sustainable for him.  It is desirable from 
economic and social viewpoints and particularly in order to maximize pre-
vention and compensation. 
B.   A Lack of Prevention 
The operator’s incentives to prevent nuclear accidents may be affected 
by the partial internalisation resulting from the nuclear subsidy.  Indeed, 
since the operator does not take into account all of the risks he generates, 
his behaviour might be inadequate to prevent accidents in an optimal way.  
Rationally, he will adopt the level of prevention corresponding to the risks 
he generates.  Therefore, if he takes, as a reference, an underestimated level 
of risks, his preventive actions are necessarily maladjusted and, thus, insuf-
ficient to impede an accident.  Indeed, the optimality of his level of preven-
tion is determined by the optimality of the level of the considered risks.  As 
a result, a sub-optimal estimation of risks leads to a sub-optimal level of 
prevention. Such an economic consequence of the lack of internalisation 
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has been analysed in the literature.106  The partial internalisation of the risk 
costs, concurrent with the operator’s liability cap, is, thus, inefficient in the 
supply of appropriate prevention incentives.  It leads to under-deterrence.  
This distortion created by the nuclear subsidy is all the more problematic 
since the potential damages of a nuclear accident are very serious and occur 
over very long periods of time. 
Therefore, to guarantee an optimal level of prevention from the nuclear 
operator, he should be exposed to his whole risk cost.  Nevertheless, even 
though the operator’s level of prevention may be lower than optimal be-
cause of the lack of incentives resulting from the nuclear subsidy it is un-
clear whether this will actually be the case in practice.  One should point to 
the importance of safety regulation as well.  The role of the nuclear safety 
authorities may fill this gap.  In this respect, we cited the important role of 
the IAEA, the NEA and EURATOM in nuclear safety regulation.  At an in-
ternational level, these agencies aim to implement regulatory safety instru-
ments in order to prevent nuclear incidents and accidents.107  These instru-
ments take the form of standards and recommendations.108  These safety 
agencies also exercise a draconian control over the members’ countries nu-
clear installations.  In France, the national safety authorities are numerous 
and organized around the ASN (Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire) and the Min-
istries of Industry and Ecology.109  In the U.S., the NRC is in charge of nu-
clear safety.  All of these organizations contribute to improve the applica-
tion of safety rules on the nuclear installations, and, thus, work to avoid nu-
clear accidents.  Besides, they are much stricter than in any other industrial 
risky activity.110 
However, these rules are regulatory and so, do not provide incentives, 
in a strict sense, to the nuclear operator; instead, they provide obligations.  
Even though the purpose is identical (the prevention of accidents), regula-
 
 106. See generally Calabresi, supra note 43; Brown, supra note 44; Shavell, Breach of 
Contract, supra note 45; Shavell, Nonmonetary Sanctions, supra note 45. 
 107. See generally supra note 12 (the IAEA “helps countries to upgrade nuclear safety 
and to prepare for and respond to emergencies…The main aim is to protect people and the 
environment from harmful radiation exposure.”). 
 108. See id. (The IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety serves as an incentive instrument 
on Parties to strive to achieve higher levels of safety in their nuclear operations.). 
 109. See The French Nuclear Safety Authority, http://www.asn.fr/sections/the-french-
nuclear-safety-authority (last visited Jan. 26, 2009) (“The ASN is an independent administra-
tive authority… tasked on behalf of the State, with regulating nuclear safety and radiation 
protection….”). 
 110. See generally U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Regulator of Nuclear Safety, 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/brochures/br0164 (last visited Feb. 2, 
2009). 
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tion and the liability rules do not employ the same means to reach it.  Regu-
lation has a compulsory and external dimension.  It is implemented and 
controlled by an outside and superior authority.  The operator is only re-
quired to apply and respect the standards it imposes. Therefore, the opera-
tor’s behaviour changes with the changes of the norms.  On the contrary, 
with a liability rule, the operator is led to modify, on his own, his behaviour 
in accordance with the risks he generates.  Liability rules are thus more dy-
namic than safety regulation (which is more difficult to change and, as a re-
sult, more static).  Especially in such a complex industry, it is often argued 
that liability rules are more efficient, from the prevention of accidents view-
point.111  Because the operator has more information about his activity, and 
more information about its risks, as compared to anyone else (e.g. the regu-
lators), he would be in a better situation to evaluate his risks, and thus, his 
corresponding level of prevention.112  Of course, liability rules maintain a 
punitive dimension by applying sanctions to operators in case of any acci-
dents (strict liability) or in case of accidents resulting from negligence (fault 
liability). 
To sum up, since the nuclear operator’s liability is limited, his incen-
tives to prevention are also limited.  In such a context, the role of the nu-
clear safety authorities is crucial to supplement the liability rule.  The ques-
tion remains, to what degree are these authorities complementary, and, cor-
respondingly, what is the efficiency level of their combination. 
C.   A Lack of Compensation 
Finally, a third consequence of the nuclear subsidy refers to the com-
pensation to victims in case of a nuclear accident.  Indeed, the current inter-
national nuclear liability regime fails regarding the compensatory capacity 
it provides.113  In this respect, it is striking to see how low the available 
amount to cover the nuclear risk is.  At a national level, the total nuclear 
compensation capacity in France currently amounts to € 231 million (€ 91 
million from the operator plus € 140 million from the State).  At a suprana-
tional level, with the additional € 150 million financed by the Conventions’ 
contracting Parties, this amount increases up to € 381 million.114  In other 
 
 111. See Faure & Van de Borre, supra note 27. 
 112. See Steven Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 
15 RAND J. OF ECON. 271 (1984). 
 113. See generally Melanie L. Oxhorn, The Norms of Nuclear Accidents After Chernobyl, 
8 J. NAT. RES. & ENVTL. L. 391(1992). 
 114. See supra Table 1. 
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words, if a nuclear accident occurs today, the maximum available sum to 
compensate the victims will only be € 381 million.  In consideration of the 
costs of a major accident, or even of a medium one, this sum is very insuffi-
cient.115 
With the 2004 Protocol, this total available amount raises in the inter-
national regime to € 1200 million at a national level, and at € 1500 million 
at a supranational level.  Therefore, if the goal of this Protocol was to make 
the Paris and Brussels Conventions (amended in 1982) compatible with the 
other new instruments, such as the modification Protocol of Vienna Con-
vention (1997), its first purpose was to ensure a greater financial compensa-
tion of damage in case of an accident.116  The increased new coverage caps 
were aimed at compensating a larger number of victims and at covering a 
broader range of damages suffered.117  However, we saw earlier that, in 
spite of the increase of the caps, the operator’s subsidy remains high and 
that a large part of the nuclear risk costs are still neither covered nor inter-
nalised.  As a consequence, the new amounts of coverage might still be too 
small to cover many nuclear accidents, particularly major accidents. 
Of course, one could argue that insufficient compensation to victims is 
not an economic consequence in the sense that whether or not a victim is 
compensated is primarily a distributional issue rather than an efficiency is-
sue.  However, it has been shown that, particularly with catastrophic losses 
potentially caused by nuclear accidents, that perspective is too simple.  The 
consequences of such accidents can be that devastating for entire (groups 
of) countries that, for example, because of affected real estate, may have fi-
nancial markets that become completely disrupted, if no guarantee can be 
given that funds are available to compensate the losses and assist in restora-
tion. Recall that the total amount available in the U.S. Price-Anderson Act 
is substantially higher ($10.76 billion) than in the international regime.118  
Still, also in the U.S. regime, it is still possible that the total amount of com-
pensation will not suffice to compensate all victims. Indeed, in regard to the 
various scenarios used to quantify the nuclear damages (from $10 billion to 
$100 billion), the U.S. Price-Anderson Act “only” provides sufficient com-
 
 115. Recall that we mentioned above the costs of a major accident were (in the various 
scenarios) estimated to vary between € 10 billion and 100 billion.  See DGEMP Report, su-
pra note 89; Schieber and Schneider, supra note 90; Spadaro and Rabl, supra note 91; Dubin 
and Rothwell, supra note 92. 
 116. See 2004 Protocol, supra note 59. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See supra Table 2. 
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pensation ($10.76 billion) in the case that the most optimistic scenario ma-
terialises.119 
In sum, even if a larger part of the risk costs are now internalised by 
the nuclear operator thanks to the 2004 Protocol, the goals initially dis-
played by the parties to the Protocol are not actually reached.  From the 
compensation viewpoint, the amendments are thus clearly deficient.  The 
regime of the U.S. Price-Anderson Act does a lot better in that respect by 
providing substantially higher amounts of compensation and by having the 
system entirely financed by the nuclear operators themselves. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
We focused on the international regime for the compensation of dam-
age caused by nuclear accidents as it originated from the OECD / NEA and, 
more particularly, discussed the existence of a large subsidy for the operator 
of a nuclear power plant resulting from a financial limit on his liability and 
State intervention in the provision of compensation.  Interestingly, in the 
1950s a similar regime originated in the U.S. under the Price-Anderson Act 
which also had a financial limit on the liability of the nuclear power plant 
operator as well as State intervention.  An important difference between the 
two regimes is, however, that the U.S., in 1982, completely abandoned the 
public funding of nuclear damage, whereas the international regime today 
still, to a large extent, relies on public funding. 
However, the regimes still show similarities, for example in the fact 
that there is still a financial limit on the liability of the nuclear operator.  
Economists have always been critical of financial limits on the liability of 
the nuclear operator. The goal of our contribution was hence to use 
economic analysis to address the potential consequences of a financial limit 
on the liability of the nuclear operator, which we qualified as a nuclear 
subsidy. 
We argue that there are a few potentially negative consequences from 
this nuclear subsidy.  One consequence is that, to the extent that liability 
rules provide incentives for prevention, the financial limit on the liability of 
the operator may lead to under-deterrence.  Of course, safety regulation 
may provide incentives for prevention as well, in addition to the own inter-
est of the operators not to lose their investment in the nuclear plant.  How-
ever, as a result of the financial cap on liability, the potential complemen-
tary function of liability rules in providing additional deterrence is lost.  A 
 
 119. See id. 
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second effect, which we described as the financial limit (and the resulting 
nuclear subsidy) is that it may disturb the competition of nuclear energy 
compared to other energy sources.  A result of nuclear energy being subsi-
dised is that relative prices are too low and that, hence, a relatively too high 
demand will follow as well.  Given the enthusiasm of some politicians in 
favour of nuclear energy, this can be problematic.  The increased reliance 
on nuclear energy should, at the policy level, lead to a debate on why, fifty 
years after the introduction of nuclear energy, this energy form still de-
serves an implicit subsidy through a financial limit on liability.  Of course, 
we do realise that other energy sources (particularly fossil fuels like coal 
and oil) may also enjoy an implicit subsidy as well by not sufficiently inter-
nalising the externalities they cause.  In those cases, there is at least (usu-
ally) no explicit legislative intervention protecting operators from the full 
exposure to liability law. 
Interestingly, the deficiencies in the nuclear liability regime which we 
found seem to be much more serious in the international regime than in the 
U.S. Price-Anderson Act.  The compensation in the U.S. Price-Anderson 
Act is substantially larger and government intervention is excluded.  The 
nuclear risk may, therefore, be better internalised in the U.S. than under the 
international regime.  However, even though under the U.S. Price-Anderson 
Act compensation is substantially larger than under the international re-
gime.  Also, in this compensation scheme, it is likely (depending upon the 
scenario) that a substantial part of the damages will remain uncompensated 
and are, therefore, not adequately internalised by nuclear operators.  By 
pointing out some of the potentially problematic consequences from the nu-
clear subsidy from an economic perspective, we argue that policy makers 
should reconsider the move to nuclear energy as a solution for the climate 
change problem or radically change the compensation regime to allow for a 
better internalisation of the nuclear risk and for a better compensation of 
victims.  Politicians should equally realize that both under the international 
regime and (to a lesser extent) in the U.S., nuclear accidents may occur and 
the amount of potential damage may largely exceed the available compen-
sation.  If no alternative source of compensation is available, this may have 
serious disruptive effects on the economy. 
The reason why nuclear power plant operators enjoy the subsidy we 
have described and analysed in this paper is, of course, that both the inter-
national regime as well as the U.S. Price-Anderson Act can be seen as a re-
sult of effective lobbying by the nuclear interest groups.  We showed that 
the nuclear lobby effectively enjoys substantial advantages as a result of the 
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preferential regime.  It can, therefore, be expected that substantial efforts 
will be invested in lobbying in order to maintain these benefits. 
However, our paper shows, by analysing the case of the nuclear sub-
sidy in France, that a full coverage of the potential risk costs by the nuclear 
operator (hence potentially unlimited nuclear liability) would be sustainable 
for him.  The price increase per kWh would moreover not even be substan-
tial.  Hence, our paper can also be seen as providing evidence that it is very 
possible to do away with the nuclear subsidy, thus providing a more ade-
quate internalisation of the nuclear risk, without substantial disrupting ef-
fects. 
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